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Dramatically rising health expenditure costs in the last decades, in particular for pre-
scription pharmaceuticals, have triggered ongoing debates about cost-sharing between
health insurers and beneﬁciaries.1 For instance, in the US, a reform of Medicare (a
federal program which provides health insurance for the elderly) which went into eﬀect
in 2006 (Medicare Part D) introduced coverage of prescription drug expenditure for
Medicare beneﬁciaries. There is, however, a coinsurance rate (the fraction of expendi-
ture on medical services paid by the insured patient) of 25 percent.2
It is typically argued that, compared to full coverage, cost-sharing schemes limit
the growth of health insurance premiums. There is a large empirical literature on the
eﬀects of prescription drug cost-sharing on health costs and health care utilization.
Empirical estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in patients’ prescription drug
charge (through higher coinsurance or higher copayment) reduces prescription drug
spending by 1 to 6 percent.3
In contrast to such short-run demand eﬀects of prescription drugs cost-sharing,
long-run supply eﬀects on pharmaceutical innovation are underresearched. Generally, a
major concern in designing health insurance systems and regulating the pharmaceutical
1In the EU, the average annual real growth rate of spending for pharmaceuticals was 4.7 per-
cent (3.8 percent in Germany) between 1998 and 2008 (OECD, 2010). In the US, there was a
more than ﬁvefold increase in spending for prescription drugs between 1990 and 2006 from 40.3
to 216.7 billion USD (see “The Kaiser Family Foundation. Prescription drug trends”, available at
http://www.kﬀ.org/rxdrugs/3057-03.cfm).
2The rate applies after some deductible, up to an initial coverage limit. After a "catastrophic"
coverage limit is reached, the coinsurance rate drops to 5 percent. In Switzerland basically all health
insurance contracts have a coinsurance rate of 20 percent for branded prescription drugs and 10 percent
for generic drugs.
3Goldman, Joyce and Zheng (2007) and Gemmill, Thomson and Mossialos (2008) provide meta-
studies on this expenditure elasticity. Motheral and Henderson (1999) ﬁnd that demand eﬀects are
prevalent with respect to branded drugs only. Landsman et al. (2005) suggests as well that demand for
prescription drugs is quite inelastic. The most convincing evidence on demand eﬀects of cost-sharing
schemes comes from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment. Based on data from this randomized
experiment, Leibowitz (1985) ﬁnds that per capita prescriptions were 25 percent higher for patients
with zero coinsurance than for patients who faced a 50 percent coinsurance rate, and 50 percent
higher than for those who faced a 95 percent coinsurance rate. Possibly as a consequence of reduced
utilization of pharmaceuticals, some studies ﬁnd that increased cost-sharing results in greater use of
inpatient and emergency medical services of patients with chronic diseases like congestive heart failure,
lipid disorders, diabetes and schizophrenia but had little eﬀect on health care utilization of patients
with non-chronic diseases (e.g., Austvoll-Dahlgren et al., 2008).
1sector is the tension between keeping prices low and ensuring that quality is high.
The main issue therefore is the joint impact of cost-sharing schemes on price-setting
behavior and the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to conduct R&D. As pointed
out by Berndt (2002, p.45): “The resolution of this static versus dynamic eﬃciency
conﬂict is likely the single most important issue facing the pharmaceutical industry”.
This paper attempts to shed light on the nature of the price-quality relationship
in pharmaceutical markets. It examines the role of cost-sharing and price regulations
in health insurance systems for both pharmaceutical R&D and drug prices. We also
explore the eﬀects of entry deregulation, which may be seen as an attempt to lower
prices of pharmaceuticals. The main issue again is whether price reductions come at
the costs of less quality-improvements of pharmaceuticals.
The proposed theoretical model builds on the “ideal variety” framework, originated
by Lancaster (1979). Although the framework has never been applied in the context of
pharmaceutical markets and vertical R&D (to the best of my knowledge),4 it captures
well the notion that patients seek the ideal drug for their type of illness.5 The horizontal
location of a pharmaceutical ﬁrm is interpreted as the type of illness to which the drug
that the ﬁrm produces is targeted to, represented as a point on the circumference of a
circle. That is, pharmaceuticals are imperfect substitutes to each other.6 Firms choose
their horizontal location along with prices and R&D spending.
We show that introducing insurance coverage of prescription drug expenditure (like
Medicare Part D) raises both drug prices and pharmaceutical R&D spending, whereas
an increase in the coinsurance rate within an existing cost-sharing scheme has the
opposite eﬀect. Intuitively, a lower coinsurance rate makes demand for pharmaceuticals
less price-sensitive and therefore allows ﬁrms to charge higher price-cost margins. This,
4The ideal variety model is sometimes used in the international trade literature (e.g. Helpman,
1981; Wong, 1995; Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2009).
5Besides realism in this respect, the ideal variety framework also has the attractive feature that the
price elasticity of demand depends on the competitive environment of ﬁrms. Notably the standard
version of the alternative (and far more often applied) “love of variety” model of monopolistic compe-
tition by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982) predicts that the price elasticity of demand for a
good − and thus the price mark-up − is constant. However, the empirical support for this prediction
is generally weak. Under a constant price elasticity, the health insurance system could not have any
eﬀect on prices for pharmaceuticals.
6Examples are pain killers, antibiotics, hypertension medication, and pharmaceutical cancer ther-
apy.
2in turn, boosts the return to R&D.
By contrast, deregulation of entry may induce higher R&D spending in the phar-
maceutical sector despite reducing price-setting power. The result suggests that the
repeated claim by pharma lobbyists − that anything which raises drug prices and prof-
its in the pharmaceutical sector would be conducive to R&D − is potentially erroneous.
Competition policy may rather be seen as a tool to raise the quality of pharmaceuticals
and limit drug expenditure at the same time. Policy measures may include encouraging
entry of foreign ﬁrms, restricting marketing practices which eﬀectively work as entry
barriers, and reducing patent breadth. In fact, patent breadth has a natural repre-
sentation in the proposed model, as a segment on the circumference of the circle of
illnesses which includes the point targeted by a pharmaceutical ﬁrm; patent protection
means that potential rivals are prohibited to locate on this segment.
We also examine the role of two kinds of price regulations for pharmaceuticals.
First, as practiced in France and Italy, prices may directly be set by the government.
We focus on the simple case where such price controls ignore R&D costs and show
that stricter direct price regulation unambiguously reduces R&D expenditure. Second,
we study the eﬀects of a price cap − a limit amount of a patients’ expenses for a
d r u gw h i c hi sr e i m b u r s e db ya ni n s u r e r . S u c hc o s t - s h a r i n gd e v i c ei sc o m m o ni nt h e
public health insurance system of Germany and Japan. We show that a stricter price
cap reduces both R&D spending on pharmaceuticals and drug prices. The results on
the R&D expenditure eﬀects of price regulations are consistent with a large body of
empirical evidence (e.g., Scherer, 1993; Vernon, 2005; Giaccotto, Santerre and Vernon,
2005).
Finally, whereas (wage) income is exogenous in the basic model, in an extension we
discuss the interplay between health status and income in a dynamic general equilib-
rium context with pharmaceutical R&D and endogenous innovation also outside the
pharmaceutical sector. The analysis accounts for the potential dependency of eﬀective
labor supply on health status. On the one hand, higher wages boost demand for phar-
maceuticals and therefore enhances R&D incentives of pharmaceutical companies. On
the other hand, a better health status raises aggregate productivity and wages. We
3analyze how health policy and increased entry into the pharmaceutical sector aﬀects
the interaction between health status and economic well-being.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation of our analysis
to the literature. Section 3 sets up the basic model with a focus on coinsurance policy.
Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium of the basic model by distinguishing the case of
restricted entry where the number of pharmaceutical ﬁr m si sg i v e nf r o mt h eo n ew i t h
an endogenous number of ﬁrms. Section 5 examines the eﬀects of price regulations
for pharmaceuticals. Section 6 closes the model by endogenizing wages and allowing
for R&D activity outside the pharmaceutical sector in a simple endogenous growth
framework. The last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are only few studies on the relationship between health policy and innovation
incentives of pharmaceutical ﬁrms. At the theoretical level, Garber, Jones and Romer
(2006) analyze the case of a single-product monopoly ﬁrm which sells a pharmaceu-
tical product. The drug is assumed to have heterogenous eﬀects on the utility of ill
consumers. The authors show that a coinsurance rate which ensures eﬃcient drug
utilization implies that proﬁts of the monopoly ﬁrm may exceed consumer surplus;
thus, R&D incentives may be excessive. Lakdawella and Sood (2005) analyze a sim-
ilar framework and argue that a health insurance contract which sets copayment at
marginal costs and where innovators are paid an ex-ante fee equal to consumer surplus
may at the same time achieve two goals: it may lead to eﬃcient drug utilization and
provide eﬃcient incentives for introducing the drug into the market. More recently,
Lakdawella and Sood (2009) argue that a public health insurance system with some
price-negotiation by the government is welfare-improving, particularly when coupled
with an increase in patent length.
The framework proposed in this paper is diﬀerent to this literature in several re-
spects. First, it captures both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation of pharmaceu-
ticals. Second, it analyzes product market competition among pharmaceutical com-
4panies rather than a monopoly ﬁrm. While monopoly situations may exist in some
pharmaceutical markets, the exclusive focus on these situations may be considered as
a shortcoming for many other markets like those for cancer medication, hypertension
medication, pain killers, and antibiotics. In such markets there is some substitutabil-
ity within product groups and pharmaceutical companies engage in price competition.
Third, and related, the main contribution of this paper may be to provide a uni-
ﬁed framework which allows us to develop a diﬀerentiated view on the price-quality
relationship in pharmaceutical markets by encompassing both health insurance and
competition policy. The salient feature to analyze competition policy is to depart from
the standard monopoly assumption. Fourth, we also provide a general equilibrium
perspective which allows us to explore the link between health and income through
endogenous vertical innovations within and outside the pharmaceutical sector. Finally,
the focus is on a positive rather than a normative analysis.
At the empirical level, Acemoglu, Cutler, Finkelstein and Linn (2006) examine
whether the ﬁrst Medicare program (the "Social Security Act of 1965") had an impact
on pharmaceutical innovation. They ﬁnd no evidence that drug spending of the elderly
( a g e d6 5 - 7 4 )r e l a t i v et ot h a to ft h en o n - e l d e r l y( 5 5 - 6 4 )w e n tu p .S i m i l a r l y ,t h e r ew a s
no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the number of new molecular entity approvals, as drug spending
was not covered by Medicare before 2006. Our theoretical analysis predicts that the
2006 Medicare reform spurs pharmaceutical innovation.
Importantly, the present paper contributes to the debate on the relationship be-
tween entry regulation and innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Extending the
standard ideal variety framework to a context with pharmaceutical R&D delivers pre-
dictions which are consistent with evidence that a higher intensity of competition may
spur innovation (e.g., Blundell, Griﬃth and Van Reenen, 1999; Aghion et al., 2009).
That competition may be positively linked to R&D has also been pointed out by
Schumpeterian growth theory (surveyed by Aghion and Howitt, 2005, 2009), challeng-
ing predictions of standard models of endogenous technical change. In Schumpeterian
growth theory, however, the possibility that competition fosters innovation rests on
the feature that ﬁrms can preserve a monopoly by innovating and their incentives to
5search for a superior technology rises when the entry threat is enlarged. In our theory,
heterogeneity and prospect of monopoly is not needed to obtain the result that entry
deregulation spurs innovative eﬀort. Moreover, we distinguish health − a n dd e m a n df o r
pharmaceuticals which is aﬀected by the health system − from "regular" consumption
goods.
Finally, Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) andA g h i o n ,H o w i t ta n dM u r t i n( 2 0 1 0 )e x -
amine the causal eﬀect of higher life expectancy on per capita income growth. They
construct a country-varying instrument for life expectancy by exploiting country diﬀer-
ences in the date when global medical innovations (like antibiotics) where introduced.
Whereas Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) ﬁnd no eﬀect, Aghion et al. (2010) ﬁnd a posi-
tive impact. There are also interesting theoretical papers on endogenous life expectancy
and economic growth. Van Zona and Muysken (2001) propose a Lucas-type growth
model, extended to include the production of health services and longevity, which is
capable to explain productivity slowdowns by low productivity of the health-sector.
Sanso and Aísa (2006) show that the long-run growth rate of the economy critically
d e p e n d so nt h er a t ea tw h i c ht h ee ﬃcacy of the resources devoted to health decreases
with biological age. These papers do not consider policy issues, however. The present
paper does not explicitly model life expectancy but shows how health policy and entry
deregulation jointly aﬀects the quality of pharmaceuticals and aggregate productivity
in a simple endogenous growth framework.
3T h e B a s i c M o d e l
There is a unit mass of individuals, indexed by . Individuals draw utility () from
consumption of a homogenous (numeraire) good, (), and their health status, (),
according to utility function
()=(()()) (1)
with partial derivatives   0,   0,   0,  ≤ 0,a n d ≥ 0 (i.e., the
marginal utility from consumption is non-decreasing in the health level).
6An individual becomes ill with probability . Illness has two consequences. First,
whereas the health level without illness is normalized to unity, it drops below one when
ill; health can be improved by consuming a pharmaceutical. Second, we allow labor
supply to positively depend on health status.7 Formally, an individual with health level
 inelastically supplies () units of labor, with 0 ≥ 0, 00 ≤ 0,a n d(1) = 1;t h a ti s ,
labor supply is unity if an individual stays healthy. The wage rate per unit of labor,
, is exogenous in the basic model and will be endogenized in section 6.
There are  pharmaceutical ﬁrms, indexed by .E a c h ﬁrm produces one drug
with identical technology in a monopolistically competitive environment. Firms cannot
engage in price-discrimination. Marginal production costs are constant and denoted
by ; that is, to produce one unit of any pharmaceutical product requires  units of the
numeraire.
We distinguish the case where the number of ﬁrms  is exogenous (restricted entry)
and the case where pharmaceutical companies can enter the market by incurring 0
units of the numeraire (i.e.,  is endogenous). For simplicity, suppose that in the case
where entry is restricted and ﬁrms earn positive proﬁts, proﬁts accrue to investors
outside the economy.
Pharmaceuticals diﬀer in one horizontal dimension of attributes. Each variety is
targeted to a certain type of illness. Illnesses are represented by points on the circum-
ference of a circle with unit length. Ill individuals are characterized by their location on
the circumference and are uniformly distributed on it. Firms choose to which illness
their drug is targeted to (i.e., choose a location on the circumference of the circle).
Diﬀerent kinds of drugs are imperfectly substitutable. For instance, some pain killers
that help well for some kinds of headache work less for other types but still have an
eﬀect, some work better for rheumatism than for headache, and so on. A certain kind
of chemotherapy may improve the health status for various forms of cancer but par-
ticular substances may be particularly well-suited for a speciﬁc type of cancer. The
same is true for illnesses caused by bacteria, which can be treated with various kinds of
7Empirical support for this assumption is provided by Cai, Mavromaras and Oguzoglu (2008).
They ﬁnd that individuals who experience health shocks respond by incremental reductions in labor
supply rather than by leaving the labor force.
7antibiotics. Typically, a speciﬁc kind of antibiotic kills or prevents breeding of a rather
wide spectrum of bacteria but is more eﬀective against certain types of bacteria than
others. As a ﬁnal example, there are several classes of medication against hypertension.
Products are quite substitutable, targeting diﬀerent sources of high blood pressure and
diﬀering with respect to side eﬀects. Thus, the structure of the pharmaceutical market
is represented here by oligopolistic competition on prices for diﬀerentiated goods.
Price setting power arises because pharmaceutical products cannot be imitated,
e.g. because of patent protection. Patent breadth has a natural representation in the
model. It is deﬁned as the sum of the lengths of the segments on the circumference of the
circle of illnesses to the left and right of the location of ﬁrm  (representing the closest
substitutes to product ) where rivals are not allowed to locate. Consider a symmetric
situation where the distance between the location of each ﬁrm on circumference of the
circle (with unit length) is 1. T h i si sa l s ot h es i z eo ft h es e g m e n to nt h ec i r c l eo f
each ﬁrm (05 on both sides of a ﬁrm’s location) which is protected by patent law.
Thus, if the patent breadth is at least 1, then no additional ﬁrm is allowed to enter.
The restricted entry case may therefore be interpreted as a situation where no ﬁrm can
enter despite positive proﬁts because it would infringe a patent. An increase in the
ﬁrm number  may thus reﬂect a change in the patent law which reduces the patent
breadth such that more ﬁrms can enter. An alternative competition policy which raises
 in the restricted entry case would be to encourage entry of foreign ﬁrms.
In the case of an endogenous number of ﬁrms, it is assumed that the patent breadth
is smaller than the equilibrium value of 1. A decrease in  in the endogenous
entry case may capture, for instance, lower administrative costs associated with weaker
entry regulation (for examples and measurement, see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes and Shleifer, 2002). Also extensive marketing eﬀort of pharma ﬁrms for branded
prescription drugs via sales representatives (who directly contact physicians) erect entry
barriers for potential rivals. Such entry barriers could be reduced (again, captured by a
decrease in ) by regulating the activities of sales representatives in the pharmaceutical
sector like restraining gift-giving to physicians. Also prohibiting drug makers to use
doctors’ prescribing data to develop marketing strategies could lead to a decrease in .
8Pharmaceutical ﬁrms can aﬀect the “quality” (i.e. the vertical dimension) of drugs
by incurring R&D costs. Higher quality means that the health status improves for
a given type of illness to which the drug is targeted to and possibly also for related
illnesses. To capture both the horizontal and vertical dimension of pharmaceuticals,
suppose that health status of an ill individual  when consuming one unit of drug  is
()=(() ) (2)
where () is the shorter (arc) distance between the illness of consumer  and the
horizontal location of ﬁrm ’s product on the circumference of the circle of illnesses; 
is the quality of drug . We assume that function  has partial derivatives   0 (i.e.,
the health level is lower when the drug is less suited),   0 with lim→∞(0) ≤ 1
(recall that unity is the upper limit of the health level by deﬁnition), and  ≤ 0
(i.e., the marginal gain in health from a quality-improvement is non-increasing in the
quality level); moreover, suppose  ≤ 0 and   0. Property   0 implies a
ranking of the impact of higher R&D on health improvement for diﬀerent patients. For
instance, consider a drug which contains antibiotics. Suppose the drug is best suited
to ﬁght (a speciﬁc form of) pneumonia but also works against some other illnesses
caused by bacteria. However, also suppose the bacteria which cause pneumonia have
developed some antibiotic resistance. Then   0 means that an increase in R&D
spending directed to overcome antibiotic resistance of bacteria which cause pneumonia
has a larger eﬀect on health for patients with pneumonia than for patients with other
bacterial infections.8
To supply a drug with quality , ﬁrm  has to incur R&D costs () which are
strictly convex in , 0  0, 00  0. Following the “endogenous sunk cost” approach
(e.g., Sutton, 1991, 1998) and “quality ladder” models of endogenous growth (e.g.,
Grossman and Helpman, 1991), R&D costs are not reﬂected in marginal production
costs.9
8See The Economist (2011) for a discussion on the eﬀorts to tackle the resistance of antibiotics,
e.g. via R&D.
9We abstract from uncertainty in the R&D process. Nothing would change, however, if ﬁrms are
successful in innovating and entering the market only with some probability, as long as there are many
9Illnesses are assumed to be perfectly and costlessly detectable by diagnostic tests.
Moreover, individuals know the horizontal and vertical location of each ﬁrm, as well as
function , and therefore are capable of choosing the product which maximizes their
utility. Alternatively, one may assume that physicians choose on behalf and in the
interest of patients. To abstract from informational constraints greatly simpliﬁes the
analysis.10
To distinguish pharmaceuticals from “regular” consumption goods, we assume that
more is not better. More precisely, ill individuals do not gain from consuming more
than one dose of a drug. For simplicity, they also do not gain from consuming diﬀerent
drugs.11
For reasons of tractability, we follow the common assumption in ideal variety models
that ﬁrms simultaneously choose price and their “location” on the circumference of the
product circle to maximize proﬁts. In the present context, they also choose the quality
 o fad r u ga tt h es a m et i m e . 12
Finally, suppose that there exists a health insurance system which covers the risk of
needing drug treatment. However, patients themselves have to pay a fraction  ∈ [01]
potential innovators which are risk-neutral. In this case, neither supply of R&D funds is aﬀected by
uncertainty (due to the law of large numbers) nor is demand.
10A priori, it seems unclear whether and how the nature of price competition in the pharmaceutical
market would change under asymmetric information between physicians and patients and/or under
limited information of both. These are challenging issues which are beyond the scope of the present
paper.
11For some diseases treatment is more eﬀective when several drugs are combined, like for attacking
HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. In our context, this would be captured by deﬁn i n gad r u ga sa
combination of active pharmaceutical ingredients in one dose. Many drugs contain several active
ingredients, so it does not matter if those are combined in, say, one injection/pill or provided via
several diﬀerent injections/pills.
12Assuming that prices and quality are chosen simultaneously draws on the seminal paper on R&D
choice under imperfect competition in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). It is shown in Appendix C that
assuming a two-stage decision process may not change results. There we suppose that ﬁrms choose
t h et y p eo fh o r i z o n t a ld i ﬀerentiation along with the vertical quality component at stage 1, whereas
at stage 2 they choose prices (product market competition). If at stage 1 ﬁrms take prices of other
ﬁrms as given (along with product quality and horizontal location), then the behavior of ﬁrms is
s h o w nt ob ee x a c t l yt h es a m ea si nt h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sj u s to n ed e c i s i o ns t a g e .T h a ti s ,n o t h i n g
changes compared to the analysis presented in the main body of the paper if we assume that ﬁrms
take the eﬀect of their product diﬀerentiation choices on their own price setting power at stage 2 into
account but do not account for the possible equilibrium price adjustments of and due to rivals at
stage 2. Unfortunately, relaxing the latter assumption would complicate the analysis to the point of
intractability.
10of the price of medication − the coinsurance rate.13 Health insurance is assumed to be
fair, i.e., the insurance premium, , is equal to the expected reimbursement of patients’
medication expenses from the insurance. In the next section we examine the eﬀect of
an increase in the coinsurance rate  on the R&D expenditure of pharmaceutical ﬁrms
and on prices of their products.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
Consider the location of ﬁrm  on the circumference of the circle of illnesses. Denote
the ﬁrm to the left of  by  and the ﬁrm to the right of  by . The shorter (arc)
distance between the location of  and  is denoted by () and the one between
between  and  by ().  ≡ ()+() is the distance between  and .D e n o t e
13We abstract from moral hazard − although sometimes being the alleged reason for implementing
coinsurance schemes in the ﬁrst place. This argument is unconvincing in the case of severe illness like
cancer or AIDS, however. In any case, health insurance systems are exogenous in our analysis.
11by 
 the patient with the ideal variety to the left of ﬁrm ’s location, who is indiﬀerent
between buying from ﬁrm  and . Similarly, consumer  is indiﬀerent between buying
from  and .
A ss h o w ni nF i g .1 , = (
) is the distance between  and 
 whereas  = ()
is the distance between  and .D e ﬁne by
 ≡ ( ),  ≡ ( ) (3)
 ≡ (() −  ),  ≡ ( − ()
| {z }
=()
−  ) (4)
the health levels of consumer 
 and , respectively, when consuming drug  (eq. (3))
and the alternative drugs ,  (eq. (4)). The associated consumption levels are given
by
 ≡ () −  − ,  ≡ () −  −  (5)
 ≡ () −  − ,  ≡ () −  −  (6)
where , ,  denote the price of drug , , . () is wage income of an individual
with health level ,  is the coinsurance payment when consuming the drug supplied
by ﬁrm ,a n d is the insurance premium. Note that (+) is the mass of consumers
buying from ﬁrm  (recall that a mass  of consumers is ill). Thus, with fair health
insurance, the insurance premium for each individual is
 =( 1− )
 X
=1
( + ) (7)
For individual 
, who is indiﬀerent to buy from ﬁrm  and ,w eh a v e
0=() − () (8)
Substituting the respective ﬁrst equations of (3)-(6) into (8) reveals that  is im-
plicitly given as function of own price and quality, price and quality of the com-
12petitor to the left, the distance to this competitor, and parameters. Write  =
∆(   ()). Similarly, for individual , who is indiﬀerent to buy
from ﬁrm  and ,w eh a v e
0=() − () (9)
Using the respective second equations of (3)-(6), (9) implies that we can write  =
∆(     − ()).
The proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrm  can then be written as
max
()
( − )[∆( ()  )+
∆(   − ()
| {z }
=()
  )] − () −  (10)
taken as given      and .
We ﬁrst derive the equilibrium of the basic model for a given number of ﬁrms (re-
stricted entry) and present comparative-static results. Then we allow for unrestricted
entry, where the number of ﬁrms is endogenous, demonstrating that the main insights
from the restricted entry case typically still hold.
4.1 Restricted Entry
An equilibrium in the restricted entry case is deﬁned as locational choices, drug prices,
and drug quality levels, in which ﬁr m sm a x i m i z ep r o ﬁts and ill consumers choose the
drug which yields the highest utility given the choices of ﬁrms. Using expression (7)
for the premium  in the ﬁrst-order conditions which result from (10), we can derive
the following lemma. (All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.)
Lemma 1. In a symmetric equilibrium for a given number of ﬁrms, where  =
 = 1
2, ()=()= 1
,  =  and  =  for all , equilibrium values (∗ ∗)




























¢ ≡ () (12)






























is the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and health under symmetry.
The ﬁrst summand on the right-hand side of eq. (11) is the marginal beneﬁto f
raising quality  which, in proﬁt maximum, must be equal to the marginal cost of
improving quality, 0(). The marginal beneﬁto fr a i s i n g is higher, the higher the
price-cost margin, −, the larger the total market size of the pharmaceutical market,
, the higher the eﬀectiveness of R&D for health, ,a n dt h el o w e ri st h ei m p a c to n
health status of deviating from the ideal variety of a patient, ||. To see intuitively
that the ratio || matters for R&D incentives consider again the case of antibiotics.
The innovation incentive is higher, the larger is for a given type of bacterium which
causes an illness the eﬀect of higher quality  on health status, , and the wider the
spectrum of bacteria and illnesses aﬀected by the antibiotic (i.e., || is lower).
Eq. (12) reﬂects that, not surprisingly, the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and health matters for price-setting behavior of ﬁrms. Prices are also
aﬀected by the marginal impact of an increase in health on wage income, 0,w h i c h
determines demand for pharmaceuticals as well. Moreover, demand becomes more
price-sensitive when the coinsurance rate, , increases.
A symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique under weak conditions. An example
of suﬃcient conditions on the primitives of the model is spelled out in Appendix B.
Uniqueness of equilibrium allows us to derive comparative-static results.
14Arguments  and  are suppressed in functions ,  and .
14Proposition 1 (Comparative-statics in the restricted entry case) In a unique equilib-
rium, (a) a higher coinsurance rate  lowers both R&D-related quality of pharmaceuti-
cals, ∗,a n dt h e i rp r i c e s ,∗. (b) A higher wage rate  raises both ∗ and ∗.( c )A n
increase in the number of ﬁrms, ,m a yr a i s e∗;f o ri n s t a n c e ,∗ is increasing in 
if  =  =0 ,





The intuition for the negative impact of a higher coinsurance rate, ,o nR & D
spending and prices (part (a) of Proposition 1) is simple. An increase in the fraction
of the drug price which a patient has to copay implies that she becomes more price-
sensitive. Thus, by raising the price of its drug, a pharmaceutical company loses more
customers to rivals. This induces ﬁrms to lower the prices as an equilibrium response.
Consequently, also the equilibrium insurance premium, ∗ =( 1− )∗, is decreasing
in . In turn, however, the reduced mark-up over marginal costs,  − ,l o w e r st h e
marginal beneﬁto fR & D .
By contrast, a higher wage rate, , raises the willingness to pay for drugs of ill
consumers due to two eﬀects. First, the price sensitivity declines after an increase in
 if better health raises the supplied labor units (0  0). This eﬀect arises since the
marginal impact of better health on wage income rises with . Second, the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and health, ,i si n c r e a s i n gi n.B o t h
eﬀects go in the same direction and explain part (b).
Part (c) of Proposition 1 can be understood as follows. Elasticity  measures by
how much the marginal beneﬁt of higher drug quality on health () declines if 
increases by one percent. Recall that a higher  means that the drug is less suited to
the particular illness of a patient. Now suppose that the number of pharmaceuticals
increases. As a result, a ﬁrm loses customers for a given R&D spending since, on
average,  decreases. Consequently, for a given price of a drug and implied by   0,
there is a higher incentive to conduct R&D in order to retain some of the customers.
This eﬀect is large if  is high. Thus, ﬁrms may conduct more R&D despite the fact
15that price-setting power is adversely aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fr i v a l s . 15
The latter result is interesting for two reasons. First, it shows that there is not
necessarily a trade-oﬀ between the goal of keeping price-setting power of pharmaceuti-
cal companies low and their R&D incentives high. To the contrary, weaker protection
against entry reduces price-setting power but may foster R&D incentives. Thus, one
has to distinguish whether price-setting power of pharmaceutical ﬁrms is aﬀected by
health insurance policy or by competition policy. Second, the result contributes to the
recent debate on the relationship between competition and innovation. The literature
has suggested that heterogeneity of ﬁr m sw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h e i rd i s t a n c et ot h et e c h n o l -
ogy frontier is critical for the result that increased competition or entry deregulation
can spur innovative eﬀort (Aghion et al., 2005; Aghion and Howitt, 2005, 2009; Aghion
et al., 2009). The basic argument runs as follows. Incumbents operating at the tech-
nology frontier can escape competition or entry, i.e., secure a monopoly position, by
innovating. Increased competition means that pre-innovation proﬁts decline whereas
post-innovation proﬁts, which are pure monopoly proﬁts by assumption, do not depend
on the number of rivals. Facilitating entry thus raises R&D expenditure. By contrast,
ﬁrms below the technology frontier see the diﬀerence between post- and pre-innovation
proﬁts decline if competitive pressure rises, as they cannot escape competition. The
present paper gives complementary insights on the competition-innovation relation-
ship. It shows that the prospect of gaining pure monopoly power from innovation is
not required for the result that increased entry spurs innovative eﬀort. Rather, the re-
sult may even hold in an environment with strategically interacting ﬁrms which possess
similar technology.
4.2 Endogenous Number of Firms
We now show that the basic insights of Proposition 1 are not critically aﬀected by
allowing for an endogenous number of ﬁrms. With unrestricted entry, in equilibrium,
15One can also show that higher market size, , typically raises R&D incentives. This result is
consistent with empirical evidence by Acemoglu and Linn (2004). According to their study, an increase
in potential market size for drugs - measured by exploiting demographic trends in the US - has fostered
pharmaceutical innovation.
16proﬁts of ﬁr m sm u s tb ez e r o ,a sﬁr m se n t e rt h em a r k e ta sl o n ga sp r o ﬁts are positive.




− () −  ≡ () (15)
a c c o r d i n gt op r o ﬁt function (10). The equilibrium quality, price, and number of ﬁrms,
denoted by (∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗), are simultaneously given by equation system  =  =  =












As shown in the proof of the following proposition, the determinant of M is positive
under weak conditions, implying uniqueness of equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Comparative-statics with an endogenous ﬁrm number) Suppose that
det(M)  0.T h e n ,s i m i l a rt ot h er e s t r i c t e de n t r y case, (a) a higher coinsurance rate,
, lowers both equilibrium quality, ∗∗, and equilibrium prices of drugs, ∗∗.( b ) A
higher wage rate, , has the opposite eﬀects. (c) Entry deregulation (decrease in )
tends to promote entry (∗∗ increases) and raises ∗∗ if (14) holds.
Proposition 2 shows that the impact of an increase in the coinsurance rate and in
the wage rate on R&D spending and on prices of pharmaceuticals is robust to allowing
for endogenous entry of ﬁrms.
Moreover, not surprisingly, the number of ﬁrms typically declines if entry costs go
up. Consistent with the eﬀects of a change in the number of ﬁrms under restricted
entry (part (c) of Proposition 1), retarding entry by higher ﬁxed costs tends to be
associated with reduced R&D spending if  is high.
5P r i c e R e g u l a t i o n s
This section examines the eﬀects of price regulations. We distinguish direct price
controls and price caps on drug expenditure reimbursement. In its simplest form,
17on which we focus in this section, a price control means that the government sets a
ﬁxed, maximum drug price in a regime where health insurance does not cover drug
expenses. A decrease in this price, which we denote by max, captures stricter direct
price regulation. By contrast, a price cap is a cost-sharing scheme which imposes a
limit amount on the costs incurred by an insured patient which is reimbursed. Like
coinsurance schemes, a price cap intends to keep insurance premiums low. The limit
p r i c ei sd e n o t e db y¯ . We relate to a decrease in ¯  as stricter price cap.
5.1 Price Control
Suppose there is no health insurance, i.e., the coinsurance rate is 100 percent ( =1 ).
A binding direct price control means that the price set by the government is below
the equilibrium price. We therefore implicitly assume in this section that, for  =1 ,
max  ∗ and max  ∗∗ h o l d .W ef o c u so nt h es i m p l e s tc a s ew h e r et h eg o v e r n m e n t
ignores R&D costs.16
With restricted entry, the equilibrium drug quality, ∗,i sg i v e nb y
(
∗ max)=0  (17)
where function  was deﬁn e di n( 1 1 ) .T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a t( 1 1 )r e ﬂects the ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to the R&D decision of ﬁrms and ﬁrms cannot set prices under
direct price controls. Under free entry, which implies that ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts are







where function  was deﬁned by (15).
Proposition 3 (Price controls) Suppose there is a binding direct price control. (a)
16Price controls follow a redistributive goal, aiming to reduce the ﬁnancial burden of the ill vis-à-vis
the healthy. Pharmaceutical prices in this regime are typically negotiated between pharmaceutical
companies and the government. Critics of price controls argue that negotiated sales prices insuﬃ-
ciently account for R&D costs. The analysis would become more complicated if R&D costs and the
eﬀectiveness of drugs played a role in the setting max.
18Stricter price regulation (decrease in max) lowers the equilibrium quality of pharma-
ceuticals; with unrestricted entry, it also reduces the number of ﬁrms, ∗∗.( b )U n d e r
restricted entry, an increase in the number of ﬁrms, , unambiguously raises the quality
of drugs, ∗. With unrestricted entry, entry deregulation (decrease in ) raises both
the quality of drugs, ∗∗,a n d∗∗.
A stricter price control limits the price-cost margin, max −, and therefore retards
R&D incentives. The proﬁt squeeze also retards entry. (part (a) of Proposition 3).
Deregulation of entry, which allows for a larger number of competitors, unambigu-
ously raises R&D expenditure under direct price controls (part (b)). Similar to the
discussion of the last result in Proposition 1, an increased number of drugs induces
pharmaceuticals companies to retain some of its customers by raising R&D. As there
is no counteracting eﬀect on R&D incentives through reduced price-setting power, the
result is unambiguous.
5.2 Price Caps
A health system which combines coverage of prescription drug expenses with a price
cap ¯ 0 on reimbursement typically raises demand for drugs vis-à-vis a free market
without any insurance. To see this, ﬁrst note that the fair insurance premium under a
binding price cap (i.e. one which is lower than the equilibrium price with full insurance)
is given by  = ¯ . Thus, total health expenditures for a customer of ﬁrm  is  −
¯  +  =  − (1 − )¯  . Hence, a stricter price cap is not an intervention in
a free market but restricts the drug expenditure subsidy to beneﬁciaries. Demand
faced by pharmaceutical companies is lowered by a stricter price cap, since a decrease
in ¯  lowers the marginal rate of substitution,  = , in equilibrium with
symmetric ﬁrms. This can be seen as follows. A customer of ﬁrm  with health status
 has a consumption level of () −  +( 1− )¯ .T h u s ,
 =
(() −  +( 1− )¯ )
(() −  +( 1− )¯ )
 (19)
The right-hand side of (19) is increasing in ¯ .W eﬁnd the following result.
19Proposition 4 (Price caps) A stricter price cap (decrease in ¯ ) lowers both the price
and quality of pharmaceuticals in symmetric equilibrium. Entry regulations have similar
eﬀects as in the basic model.
Since the marginal rate of substitution decreases with a stricter price cap, ﬁrms have
less price setting power which in turn is associated with a decrease in R&D spending.
Regarding entry regulations, the same discussion as for Proposition 1 and 2 applies.
6 General Equilibrium with Endogenous Growth
In this section we extend the basic model (with a coinsurance scheme) to a simple
dynamic general equilibrium framework with endogenous income growth. We examine
the interaction between R&D spending of pharmaceutical companies and aggregate
productivity in the consumption goods sector, endogenizing the wage rate, .O n e
key feature of the analysis is to allow for individual labor supply to depend on health
status. Consequently, illness and its pharmaceutical treatment may have eﬀects on the
scale of the economy and, thus, on productivity and wages.
6.1 Dynamic Set Up
Suppose that individuals inelastically supply their labor to a perfect labor market.
Output  of the numeraire consumption good at time  =1 2 is produced under









d +  (20)
0 1. () denotes the quantity of intermediate input  ∈ [0] and () is a
productivity measure of input .17 () can be aﬀected by in-house R&D of single-
product ﬁrm  in period .  is labor input in ﬁnal goods production.  is the input
of a resource which is available in ﬁxed supply, ¯ , and has productivity . We assume
that the associated factor market is competitive, i.e., the price of the ﬁxed factor is .
17Time index  is omitted whenever this does not lead to confusion.
20The pharmaceutical sector is similar to the basic model. Suppose, however, that
pharmaceutical companies use the ﬁxed resource (rather than the numeraire) as input
in both the R&D process and the production of pharmaceuticals. One unit of the ﬁxed
resource can be transformed into one unit of the drug, i.e., unit costs are ,a si nt h e
partial equilibrium analysis. Also suppose that quality level  o fad r u gr e q u i r e s()
units of the ﬁxed factor, where 0  0, 00  0;18 thus, R&D costs of pharmaceutical
ﬁrms are given by ()=(). We assume that  is proportional to the average






()d ≡ ¯  (21)
capturing intersectoral spillover eﬀects. The introduction of the ﬁxed factor together
with (21) implies that costs in the pharmaceutical sector grow with the same rate as ¯ .
This implies the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium (BGE). A BGE is deﬁned
as a long run equilibrium in which all variables grow at a constant rate.




where () is labor input in the R&D process of intermediate good producer , 0  0,
00  0.T e r m¯ −1 in (22) captures a standard intertemporal knowledge spillover eﬀect,
which will drive economic growth in the model.
The intermediate goods sector is monopolistic. One unit of the numeraire good
c a nb et r a n s f o r m e di n t oo n eu n i to fa ni n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t . M o r e o v e r ,p r o d u c t i o n
requires a ﬁxed number of labor units, ¯ 0, each period (Young, 1998). The mass of
intermediate goods, , is endogenous. That is, intermediate good ﬁrms enter as long
as proﬁts are non-negative.
We simplify the analysis by focussing on restricted entry in the pharmaceutical
18We implicitly assume that ¯  −  − (∗)  0 holds. That is, in equilibrium, a positive amount
of the ﬁx e dr e s o u r c ei su s e di nt h ec o n s u m p t i o ng o o ds e c t o ra f t e r units of pharmaceuticals are
produced and the resource is used for R&D input of the  pharmaceutical ﬁrms. As equilibrium
quality of pharmaceuticals, ∗, does not depend on ¯ , the condition holds whenever ¯  is suﬃciently
large.
21sector (i.e., the number of pharmaceutical ﬁrms, , is exogenous). Moreover, we assume
that each individual lives one period and specify the utility function to
()=l n +  (23)
i.e.,  =  =0 .
6.2 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
We ﬁrst look at the pharmaceutical sector by recalling the partial equilibrium analysis
in section 4. First deﬁne ˆ  ≡  ¯  and ˆ  ≡  ¯ .I n B G E , ˆ  and ˆ  turn out
to be constant, i.e., the equilibrium price of pharmaceuticals and the wage rate grow
w i t ht h es a m er a t ea sa v e r a g ep r o d u c t i v i t y ¯ . Moreover, note that ()=() ¯ ,














≡ ˆ () (24)
Note that ˆ 0()  0, i.e., there is a positive relationship between productivity-adjusted
prices and the quality of pharmaceuticals. Moreover, rewriting (12) by using (13) and
(23), dividing by ¯ , and substituting (24) leads to
ˆ  =































Part (b) of Proposition 1 suggests that, under weak conditions, the relationship between
ˆ  and  i sp o s i t i v e .I nf a c t ,t h en u m e r a t o ro nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 2 5 )i si n c r e a s i n g




22i.e., if the impact of better health on individual labor supply is small and/or decreasing
fast, as plausible. Thus, assumption A1 is suﬃcient (but not necessary) for   0.
Now we look outside the pharmaceutical sector and at the labor market equilibrium.
Total labor supply  in the economy is the sum of labor supply of the healthy, 1−,
and of ill individuals:











Lemma 2. Outside the pharmaceutical sector, we ﬁnd the following relationship


















≡ ˜ () (28)
where ∗ is the (time-invariant) equilibrium R&D labor input of each intermediate




∗ − ¯  =0  (29)
T h eg r o w t hr a t eo f ¯  is given by (∗) − 1 at all times and does neither depend on
the coinsurance rate, , nor on the number of pharmaceutical ﬁrms, .
Lemma 2 shows that the (adjusted) wage rate is positively related to aggregate
labor supply in the economy. Thus, a better quality of pharmaceutical products is
positively associated with the marginal product of labor in the ﬁnal consumption sector,
 =  ( ˜   0) whenever individual labor supply depends on health status
(0  0) . L e m m a2r e ﬂects a scale eﬀect which is typical in models with endogenous
technical change. The reason for the scale eﬀect can be seen as follows. Denote by 
the expenses in terms of the numeraire for the production of intermediate goods, i.e.,
we have ()= for all  under symmetry. Moreover, note that ()= ¯  for
all .T h u s , ( 2 0 ) i m p l i e s  = ( ¯ )1− + ¯ . Hence, the eﬃciency of labor,
 ¯ , and thus aggregate productivity in the economy is increasing in the number of
intermediate good ﬁrms, . This property captures specialization gains. It has been
used extensively in both trade theory (e.g., Ethier, 1982) and endogenous growth theory
23(e.g., Romer, 1990). Since equilibrium R&D labor input per intermediate good ﬁrm,
∗, is independent of labor supply, there is no scale eﬀect in the growth rate of ¯ ,
consistent with empirical evidence (Jones, 1995). However, an increase in aggregate
labor supply, , raises market size in the intermediate goods sector. Consequently,
as formally shown in the proof of Lemma 2, the equilibrium number of intermediate
good ﬁrms, , is proportional to labor supply, . It follows that better health which
results from quality-improvements of pharmaceuticals raises the marginal product of
labor. Apart from its speciﬁc microfoundation in the model, it is the generally plausible
health-productivity relationship which − together with the demand side reﬂected by
(25) − gives rise to the insights of this section.
Lemma 3. (a) There are no transitional dynamics.(b) Possibly, there are multiple
BGE. (c) A BGE exists and is unique, if (i) (0)  ˜ (0), (ii) assumption A1
holds, and (iii) () is convex as a function of .
Transitional dynamics are absent (part (a) of Lemma 3) as a consequence of the
time-invariance of the R&D labor input per ﬁrm outside the pharmaceutical sector
(Lemma 2), ∗, and the linear spillover eﬀect in R&D technology (22).
24Part (b) of Lemma 3 is an implication of the positive wage-health relationships
(25) and (28). On the one hand, according to (25), and as argued in the equilibrium
analysis of the basic model, a higher wage rate makes demand for pharmaceuticals less
price-sensitive, which is associated with higher R&D incentives (  0). On the
other hand, according to (25), better health through medical innovations raises the
wage rate due to the scale eﬀect explained above, whenever 0  0 ( ˜   0). This
positive interaction is the source of potential multiplicity of equilibrium.
F i g . 2s h o w sas i t u a t i o nw i t hau n i q u eB G E ,w h i c hf u l ﬁlls presumptions (i)-(iii)
in Lemma 3. Moreover, ˜ () is increasing in  (i.e., 0  0 is assumed). We can
employ Fig. 2 to show the following.
Proposition 5 (Comparative-statics in general equilibrium) Suppose a unique BGE
exists. Then, (a) an increase in the coinsurance rate, , reduces both the quality of
pharmaceuticals (∗) and their (productivity-adjusted) prices (ˆ ∗)i nB G E ;i f0  0,i t
also reduces the (productivity-adjusted) wage rate ( ˆ ∗). (b) An increase in the number
of pharmaceutical ﬁrms, ,r a i s e s∗ and, if 0  0,a l s or a i s e sˆ ∗ if (14) holds.
(c) The growth rate of both the wage rate and prices of pharmaceuticals in BGE are
i n d e p e n d e n to fb o t h and .
As there are no transitional dynamics, a change in the coinsurance rate ()o ri n
the number of pharmaceutical companies () leads to a jump towards the new BGE.
Part (a) of Proposition 5 can easily be understood. Recall that   0, according
to (26). Thus, the −curve in  − ˆ −space shifts leftward when the coinsurance
rate increases, say, from 0 to 1  0 (see Fig. 2). As explained after Proposition
1, an increase in  makes demand for pharmaceuticals more price-sensitive. In turn,
R&D spending in the pharmaceutical sector declines for a given wage rate. In general
equilibrium, this eﬀect is associated with a lower wage rate whenever labor supply
depends on health status.
To show that part (b) holds, recall from Proposition 1 that there may be a positive
relationship between the number of pharmaceutical ﬁrms and pharmaceutical R&D
spending per ﬁrm. For instance, if (14) holds, such that   0,t h e−curve
25shifts rightward when the number of ﬁrms in the pharmaceutical sector, , increases.
Moreover, an increased choice set of pharmaceuticals improves average health status
for a given drug quality .T h u s ,t h e˜ −curve shifts upwards if  increases, whenever
0  0, according to (28). This reinforces the positive impact of higher entry on both
ˆ  and .
Finally, regarding part (c) of Proposition 5, recall that there is no scale eﬀect
with respect to the growth rate of average productivity ¯ , (∗) − 1. Thus, both 
and  grow with the same rate as ¯ . Consequently, both wage and price growth are
independent of policy measures towards the pharmaceutical sector.
In addition to examining the eﬀects of coinsurance schemes on wages and health, the
analysis in this section contributes from the theoretical side to the recent debate on the
impact of higher life expectancy through medical innovations on economic outcomes
(e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 1997; Aghion et al., 2010). It suggests that the eﬀect is
positive, in line with Aghion et al. (2010), if labor supply depends on health status.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined the role of cost-sharing schemes in health insurance sys-
tems for prices of pharmaceuticals, R&D expenditure of pharmaceutical companies,
aggregate productivity, and wages. The analysis suggests that extending coinsurance
or applying stricter price regulations typically adversely aﬀects pharmaceutical R&D
spending while lowering drug prices. By contrast, lifting entry barriers may spur phar-
maceutical innovations despite reducing price setting power. This happens when better
suitability of a drug for patients, resulting from increased variety, leads to a suﬃcient
increase in the eﬀectiveness of R&D on health. In this case, stronger competition im-
plies that ﬁrms attempt to retain some of their customers by quality-improvements in
response to loss in market share. This calls into question the standard argument of
pharma lobbyists that securing price-setting power − and therefore high proﬁts − of
pharmaceutical companies via entry regulation leads to high R&D spending. Examples
for appropriate entry deregulation policies in the pharmaceutical sector would be to
26limit non-informative marketing expenses, to promote access of foreign pharmaceutical
companies to domestic markets, or to reduce patent breadth. Thus, the analysis pro-
vides a diﬀerentiated view on the often debated conﬂict in health policy between saving
costs in health insurance systems and providing R&D incentives of ﬁrms. The results
suggest that such a trade-oﬀ exists with respect to the analyzed aspects of health insur-
ance systems but not necessarily with respect to competition policy. More generally,
extending the ideal variety framework to allow for vertical R&D seems valuable for
industrial policy design also beyond the present context of pharmaceutical markets,
e.g., for health services.
The analysis may also be helpful to predict supply eﬀects of the 2006 Medicare
reform in the US. This reform introduced coverage of expenses for prescription drugs,
eﬀectively reducing the coinsurance rate from 100 percent to 25 percent and less. Our
results obtained in the coinsurance regime thus suggest that the reform induces phar-
maceutical ﬁrms to intensify their innovative eﬀort.
The general equilibrium extension of the basic model to an endogenous growth
framework gives rise to the conclusion that lower R&D expenditure in the pharmaceu-
tical sector is associated with a reduction in aggregate productivity, in turn depressing
the wage rate per unit of labor, when individual labor supply depends on health status.
Future research may build on the proposed theory to quantify welfare eﬀects and
to derive socially optimal cost-sharing schemes. For instance, limiting the coinsurance
rate on drug expenditures may be warranted for a number of reasons. First, there is the
standard positive welfare eﬀect of providing health insurance to risk-averse households.
Second, as focussed upon in this paper, R&D spending may be adversely related to
the coinsurance rate. Thus, limiting cost-sharing may enlarge standard intertemporal
“standing-on-shoulders” externalities from pharmaceutical R&D. For simplicity, such
spillover eﬀects have been ignored in this paper but should be allowed for in future
research, along with other, possibly negative, R&D externalities (see e.g. Jones and
Williams, 2000).
The analysis has emphasized that a better health status from the provision of higher-
quality drugs may positively interact with the economic well-being of individuals. In a
27welfare analysis, also such eﬀects would have to be weighted against higher prices for
pharmaceuticals which result when coinsurance rates are lowered or price caps lifted.
Finally, it may be fruitful to investigate how the nature of price competition changes
in the pharmaceutical sector along with R&D incentives when physicians have superior
information and pursue own interests, e.g. inﬂuenced by sales representatives.
Appendix
A: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with proﬁt-maximization



























































(() −  )




































(() −  )
In a symmetric situation, where  =  = 1
2, ()=()= 1
,  =  and  = 
for all ,a n dt h u s =  =  =  =  as well as  =  =  =  = ,
we have
∆
() =0 5 and
∆
() = −05, according to (33) and (37), respectively, using
(36) and (40). Thus, (30) holds. Moreover, (31) leads to (11), using (34) and (38) as















¢ =0  (41)
Also note that  +  = 1













29according to (5) and (3). Finally, rewriting (11) to













substituting (43) into (41) and using (42) conﬁrms (12). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Comparative-static results are conﬁrmed using the im-






⎠ is negative if   , which ensures uniqueness of































= ( − ) (48)
We have   0,   0,  =  =0 ,   0, according to (11), and   0,   0,
  0, according to (12) and (13). Comparative static results regarding changes in 
and  then follow from (44)-(47), conﬁrming parts (a) and (b).






























a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 3 ) . T h u s , ≥ 0 if  =  =0 .I f ,i n a d d i t i o n ,00 =0and
 ≥ 1,t h e n ≥ 0, according to (49). This concludes the proof. ¥
30P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :First, note that   0,   0   0   0 and
 =  =0 , according to (15). As a remark,
det(M)= +  +  −  −  −  (50)
is positive if   0 and  is small in magnitude. (Clearly, these are not necessary
conditions for det(M)  0.) For instance,   0 holds if 0 is zero or small such that
 ≤ 0 (see also Appendix B). According to (13), if 0 = 00 =  =  =0
and  =1in equilibrium, then  =  =  =0and therefore det(M)  0
(recall that   0,   0,   0 and   0).





































= −( − ) (56)
From (51)-(54) we can conﬁr mt h ei m p a c to fa ni n c r e a s ei n and  on ∗∗ and ∗∗
(parts (a) and (b)). Concerning part (c), from (55), we ﬁnd that ∗∗  0 if
 ≥ 0,w h i c hi sf u l ﬁlled if (14) holds (see the proof of part (c) of Proposition 1).
Finally, (56) implies that ∗∗  0 if  ≤ 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: To prove the results for the restricted entry case, recall
that   0,   0,   0 and apply the implicit function theorem. To prove the
31results in the case of unrestricted entry, recall that   0,   0,   0,   0,





⎠ is positive. Applying the
























= −()  0 (60)
This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: As argued in subsection 5.2, health expenditures for a
customer of ﬁrm  are  − ¯  +  (with  = ¯ )r a t h e rt h a n +  compared to the
basic model with coinsurance. Thus, (5) and (6) become
 ≡ () −  +( 1− )¯ ,  ≡ () −  +( 1− )¯  (61)
 ≡ () −  +( 1− )¯ ,  ≡ () −  +( 1− )¯  (62)
With this modiﬁcation, the conditions for a proﬁt maximum of ﬁrms under restricted
entry in Lemma 1, eqs. (30)-(40), remain unchanged except that we have to set  =1





and  =  hold under


















¢ ≡ ¯ ( ¯ ) (64)
32where





























If the number of ﬁrms is endogenous, equilibrium values (∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗) are given by
()= ¯ ( ¯ )=()=0  (66)
Since  is increasing in ¯ ,w eh a v e ¯ ¯   0. The remainder of the proof is then
analogous to the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 (where we used property   0)a n d
implies that a decrease in ¯  has similar eﬀe c t st h a na ni n c r e a s ei n in the basic model.
A change in the number of ﬁrms has a similar eﬀect on function ¯  than on function 
of the basic model. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: As the consumption good sector is competitive, it takes
prices for intermediates as given. The inverse demand function for good  thus reads
()=(()())1− ≡ p(()). Marginal costs are unity. Each ﬁrm















 () − ¯  (68)







 () − ¯  (69)
where we used expression (67) for () and (22) for () in the latter equation. Max-







 =  (70)
33Free entry in the intermediate goods sector implies that ()=0for all . Combining
(70) with the zero-proﬁt condition by using (69) conﬁrms (29).
Next, note that the wage rate is given by
 =







Using (67), (22) and ()=∗ we can write




Combining the two expressions (70) and (72), again using ()=∗,g i v e su s
(
∗ + ¯ )=
 (73)




∗ + ¯ ) (74)




(1 + )(∗ + ¯ )
 (75)
Hence, as claimed in the text,  is proportional to labor supply, . Dividing (72) by
¯  and using from (22) that
()= ¯  = ¯ −1(
∗) (76)








Substituting (75) into (77) and using both (27) and (29) conﬁrms (28). Finally, ac-
c o r d i n gt o( 7 6 ) ,w eh a v e ¯  ¯ −1 = (∗). This concludes the proof. ¥
34P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :To prove part (a), note that in view of the time-invariance
of equilibrium R&D labor input ∗, (25) and (28) give us two equations with two
unknowns, ˆ  and ,i np e r i o d. The two variables thus jump directly to a steady
state; therefore also ˆ  does, according to (24). (27), (74), (75) imply that also , ,
 are time-invariant. Moreover, substituting (67) into (20) and using  = ¯ −−()
as well as (21) we ﬁnd that output is given by






 + ¯  −  − ()
´
 (78)
Since ,  and  are time-invariant in equilibrium,  grows with the same rate
as ¯  from the initial period onwards. The same is true for individuals’ equilibrium
consumption of the ﬁnal good, given by (42), as both  and  grow with the same rate
as ¯ .
To conﬁrm part (b) it suﬃces to note that when function  is not convex as a
function of  (which may well be the case since  depends on third derivatives of
functions ,  and )t h e nt h e−curve and ˜ −c u r v em a yi n t e r s e c tm o r et h a no n c e
in  − ˆ −space. Finally, part (c) can be conﬁrmed by using Fig. 2 (note that the
˜ −c u r v ei sh o r i z o n t a l ,u n l i k ei nF i g .2 ,i f0()=0for all ). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 :See the discussion of the result in the main text. ¥
B: Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Deﬁn et h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 4 3 )a s() and note that 0()  0.T os h o wt h a t
an equilibrium exists under weak conditions, consider the following case. Suppose that
0(0) = 0 (thus, (0) = )a n dlim→∞ 0() →∞ .M o r e o v e r ,l e tlim→0  →∞
and   .S i n c e  0 and  ≥ 0,  is decreasing in , implying
  0.T h u s ,   implies that in  − −space the  =0locus (function
()) is always steeper than the  =0locus.

















and note that an interior and unique level of ˜  exists due to the boundary conditions











thus, at ( ˜  ˜ ) the consumption level is zero and lim→0  →∞implies ( ˜  ˜ ·)=
0. Hence, ( ˜  ˜ ·)=0 , according to (12) and (79). Now suppose ˜  ( ˜ ).T h i s
means that at  = ˜ ,t h e =0locus is above the  =0locus in −−space. Since
the latter is steeper than the former, there is exactly one intersection point of function
() and the  =0locus, i.e., the equilibrium exists and is unique.
To lead back existence and uniqueness of equilibrium to the primitives of the model,
note from   0,   0 and   0 that    always holds if   0.
As u ﬃcient (but not necessary) condition for   0 is  ≤ 0. For instance,
 ≤ 0 holds if 0 is small or |00| is large, according to (13). (  0 if 0 =0 .)
Moreover, note from (79) and (80) that ˜  and ˜  do not depend on marginal cost .
Thus, using (43), we have ˜ ( ˜ ) if  is suﬃciently small.
C: Two-stage Decision
Suppose that, alternatively to the analysis in the main body of the paper, ﬁrms
engage in a two-stage decision process. At stage 1, they choose the type of horizontal
diﬀerentiation along with the vertical quality component. At stage 2, they choose prices
(product market competition). There are two ways to analyze the model in this case.
First, ﬁrms foresee the Bertrand equilibrium for any vector of horizontal and vertical
location of ﬁrms and take the related equilibrium responses into account at stage 1.
Unfortunately, the analysis becomes intractable.19
19Lancaster (1979) and applications of the ideal variety model in the context of goods trade also
36The second way to analyze the two-stage problem is to assume that at stage 1 ﬁrms
take prices of other ﬁrms as given (along with product quality and horizontal location)
and therefore only foresee the impact of their choices on their price setting power for
given prices of rivals. In this case, the behavior of ﬁr m si se x a c t l yt h es a m ea si nt h e
case where there is just one decision stage.
To see this, note that at stage 2 the optimal price of each ﬁrm fulﬁlls ﬁrst-order
condition (32), which gives us the optimal price of ﬁrm . Recalling that ∆ is a
function of  ()   and ∆ is a function of    − ()  ,w e
see that (32) gives us  implicitly as a function of ()    .W r i t e








∆( ˜ (()·) ()·)+
∆( ˜ (()·)   − ()·
i
− () −  (81)
where ﬁr m st a k ea sg i v e n    .T h eﬁrst-order condition with respect to
vertical diﬀerentiation  is:























Applying the envelope theorem, the term is squared brackets of (82) becomes zero,
a c c o r d i n gt os t a g e2ﬁrst-order condition (32). Thus, (82) coincides with ﬁrst-order
condition (31) of the proﬁt maximization problem (10). An analogous argument holds
for the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to horizontal diﬀerentiation () associated
with proﬁt maximization problem (81); it coincides with (30). This conﬁrms the claim.
focus on simultaneous choices of horizontal location of ﬁrms and prices.
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